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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(7) allows a person who is dissatisfied by a decision
of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review by complying
with the procedures and requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures
Act." Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or Court
of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative hearings.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Board correctly apply the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 49-11504(9) (2007) in calculating Kevin McLeod's ("Mr. McLeod's") retirement
benefit based on two periods of service?

2.

Did the Board correctly deny Mr. McLeod's claim of equitable estoppel against
Utah Retirement Systems ("URS") as a government agency when Mr. McLeod
failed to show an unusual circumstance or that URS made a statement to him on
which he reasonably relied to his detriment?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. McLeod argues that the Board mistakenly calculated his retirement benefit by
calculating his retirement benefit based on two different periods of service in accordance
1

with Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(2007). The Court of Appeals has stated that it reviews
the "Board's application or interpretation of a statute 'as a question of law under the
correction-of-error standard." Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16 t 5,157 P.3d 797,
799.
Mr. McLeod also argues that the Board should be equitably estopped from
denying his claim. Mr. McLeod's estoppel "claim presents a mixed question, which
involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v. Retirement Bd, 2007 UT App 87, ^ 8,
157 P. 3d 362 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 33 n. 12, 70 P.3d 111). The
Court of Appeals has stated that it "reviews the underlying facts for clear error and the
application of the law to those facts for correctness." See id. f 9.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) (a)(b) (2007):
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's
allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all
service credit accrued prior to that date; and
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates.
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613(1)(2009), All members, retirees,... or covered individuals of a
system . . . shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this title. .. ."

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for review from the final order of the Board, dated December 17,
2009, taken on the Request for Board Action of Mr. McLeod.
2

On August 19, 2009, this matter came before the Board's Hearing Officer, Richard
C. Howe ("Hearing Officer"), under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613, for a formal
administrative hearing on Mr. McLeod's claim that his post-retirement benefits be
calculated using his post-retirement final average salary for all his years of service.
Hearing Officer issued a Memorandum Decision on October 14, 2009, denying Mr.
McLeod's request for additional retirement benefits, holding that the URS correctly
followed the applicable statute in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement benefits, and that
URS was not estopped from calculating his benefit in accordance with the statute under
common law. On December 17, 2009, the Board adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The Hearing Officer made, and the Board adopted, the following findings of fact
which are the basis of this appeal:
1.
Mr. McLeod worked for Bountiful City and then for the Davis
County Sheriffs Office accruing just over 20 years of service credit in the
Public Safety Noncontributory Retirement System by November 1996.
Hearing Transcript [hereinafter "HT"] 5:4-12.
2.
In or about October 1996, Mr. McLeod was offered a position at
Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17, 22:[1]5-21.
3.
Mr. McLeod testified that he was concerned about his financial
situation and determined to call the retirement department at the Utah State
Retirement Office ("URS") with questions about his benefits. HT 12:2-9.
4.
URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and
URS at any time during the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr.
McLeod claimed to have spoken with URS by telephone at least twice in
3

October or November of 1996 regarding what would happen if he were to
retire from Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis County at
a later date. HT 13:3-20:2.
5.
Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a
document or a recording, of the substance of any conversations with URS
in 1996. The only evidence of the substance of these conversations is Mr.
McLeod's testimony that a URS employee told him if he retired and later
returned to work for Davis County that his retirement benefit would be
cancelled upon his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time,
his benefit would be based on all his years of service credit combined and
would be calculated as one period of service.
6.
URS disputed Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee told
him that if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years
would be recalculated at his second retirement based on one period of
service and using his new and significantly higher three highest years of
salary.
7.
Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS
with the understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two
years to the same office, retire later a second time and have his retirement
benefit calculated on the basis of one period of employment. However, he
has not met his burden of proof that he was actually told that.
8.
Mr. McLeod retired from his Davis County Sheriffs Office position
in December 1996 and went to work for Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17,
22:[1]5-21.
9.
Between December 1996 and January 1999, URS paid Mr. McLeod
his statutorily earned retirement benefits totaling approximately $50,000.
HT: 85:8-15.
10. Mr. McLeod returned to work for Davis County in January 1999,
and pursuant to the retirement laws, had his retirement benefit cancelled
while he remained employed. HT 22:25-23:4; 86:7-15.
11.
In March of 2001, while still employed by Davis County, Mr.
McLeod contacted URS and understood for the first time that his benefit
would not be calculated the way he wished. HT 37:17-38:21.
12. Mr. McLeod continued working for the Davis County Sheriffs
Office until April 16, 2007, when he voluntarily terminated his
4

employment, retired, and began receiving his retirement benefits. HT 47:518;48:2-25.
13.
In April 2007, URS calculated Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit,
pursuant to the relevant statute, based on two periods of service: 1) the
service he performed prior to his first retirement, and 2) the service he
performed between his first and second retirement. URS then added these
calculations together to determine Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit. Mr.
McLeod received full retirement service credit for each of his years he
worked for public employers participating with URS. HT 170:17-23; 240:
15-22.
Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 292-96. See, Addendum A.
In addition to the Board's stated findings of fact, the Board notes that:
In 1996, URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS.
HT 156:16-157:20. According to URS policy, in 1996, telephone questions regarding
post-retirement benefit calculation would have been answered by Judy Lund ("Ms.
Lund"), Director of the Retirement Department at URS. HT 222:24-223:20. Mr.
McLeod claims that an unnamed URS employee told him that his retirement benefit
would be cancelled upon his reemployment, his benefit would be based on all his years of
service credit, and that his benefit would not be adversely or negatively affected by
working more years. HT 15:9-16:21; 72:4-73:15. Ms. Lund specifically testified at the
hearing that she would not have told Mr. McLeod what he claims the unidentified URS
employee said, and that she does not know any URS employee that would have made
those statements. HT 182:17-183:5; 225:15-226:4 ; 254:2-5.
Thus, URS specifically disputes Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee
told him that if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be
recalculated at his second retirement using his new and significantly higher three highest
5

years of salary. HT 182:1-183:5; HT 225:10-226:4; and HT 235: 6-23. This was not the
law in 1996, and despite taking over 20 depositions of current and previous URS
employees, Mr. McLeod could produce no evidence outside of his own word that URS
ever made such a statement to him or any other similarly situated individual during this
time period. Hence, the most likely scenario as to what was said in that phone
conversation was that Mr. McLeod misunderstood what the URS employee was telling
him regarding his benefits.
In fact, all of the actual written communication between URS and Mr. McLeod
shows that URS was uniformly consistent in informing Mr. McLeod that his benefit
would be calculated based on two periods of service in accordance with UTAH CODE
ANN. §49-11-504(9). HRat 171, 174, 176-177, 179, and 182; See a/so, HR at 216; HT:
39:13-47:21. This statute provides that his first retirement benefit would be reinstated,
and any new service credit earned after his first retirement would be calculated separately
and supplement that benefit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Hearing Officer correctly determined that URS properly interpreted and
applied Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9)(2007) in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement
benefit in 2007. Mr. McLeod "retired" from his position with Davis County in December
1996 and began receiving retirement benefits with URS. In January 1999, Mr. McLeod
was reemployed with Davis County, and pursuant to the applicable statute at that time,
had his retirement benefit cancelled. When Mr. McLeod retired again in April 2007,
6

URS calculated his benefit based on two periods of service in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. §49-ll-504(9)(2007) which states,
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's
allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all
service credit accrued prior to that date; and
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates.
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) specifically enumerates two distinct service time periods
for recalculating a retirement benefit. The statute's plain language requires a
recalculation based on a) "all service credit accrued prior to [the retiree's original
retirement] date, and, b) "all service credit accrued between the first and subsequent
retirement dates." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-504(9)(emphasis added). By using the
conjunction "and" between the two subsections, the Legislature clearly indicated that
URS should use both applicable formulas in calculating Mr. McLeod's post-retirement
benefits and not one or the other as Mr. McLeod desires. Thus, these two subsections
clearly state that the retirement benefit should be calculated in two pieces based on the
two service time periods.
However, in the alternative, even if the statute is found to be ambiguous, the
statutory construction rules and public policy considerations show that URS correctly
applied the law in calculating Mr. McLeod's benefits. URS is mandated to provide
retirement benefits on an "actuarially sound basis" and "consistent with sound fiduciary
and actuarial principals." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103. Ms. Lund, Director of the
Retirement Department at URS, testified at the hearing that allowing Mr. McLeod to
7

retire and take benefits for two years, then cancel his benefit and recalculate it one piece
based on a higher final average salary like he desires, would have a negative actuarial
impact on the retirement system and increase the retirement contribution rate. HT 233:411. Therefore, the better interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) is URS'
interpretation of how to calculate a post-retired employee's benefit which is consistent
with "sound actuarial principles" and in accordance with the purpose of Title 49, the Utah
Retirement Act.
In addition, to not prevailing under the plain language of the statute, the Hearing
Officer also correctly determined that Mr. McLeod's estoppel claim against URS failed
because Mr. McLeod failed to prove an unusual circumstance with such certainty to
obtain estoppel against URS as a governmental entity, and because even if the Hearing
Officer applies the common law estoppel rules, Mr. McLeod failed to prove either that
URS made a statement that it later repudiated or that Mr. McLeod reasonably relied to his
detriment on that alleged statement.
"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances'
'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.' This exception applies, however,
only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public Service Comm fn, 839
P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(internal citations omitted). Given that Mr. McLeod could not
produce any evidence other than his own self-serving testimony regarding the substance
of his alleged conversations with URS in 1996, the Hearing Officer correctly determined
8

that, "I do not find certainty here in trying to reconstruct what was said in oral
conversations taking place in 1996 between Petitioner [Mr. McLeod] and unknown
persons at URS." HR at 263 (emphasis added). Because of this lack of certainty about
the facts, Mr. McLeod failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or grave injustice
required to prevail against URS as a governmental entity.
Even if Mr. McLeod could sustain an estoppel claim against URS as a
governmental entity, Mr. McLeod cannot prove the elements of estoppel. Specifically,
Mr. McLeod did not prove that URS made any statement which it later repudiated, nor
did Mr. McLeod reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged statements made by URS.
Utah Courts have stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Mr.
McLeod bears the burden to prove:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.
Holland v. Career Service Review Bd, 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(rejecting
employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(holding that Board was estopped from
decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his employment and retired). Mr.
McLeod cannot meet either of the first two elements of estoppel, let alone all of them as
required to prevail.
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First, Mr. McLeod failed to prove that URS made a statement to him which was
incorrect as required under the first element of estoppel.
In order to prevail under this element, Mr. McLeod must challenge the Board's
findings of fact. However, Mr. McLeod failed to properly challenge the Board's findings
of fact because he did not "marshal the evidence" supporting the Hearing Officer's
findings as required under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However,
even if this Court were to review the Board's findings for "clear error", the hearing
record supports the Board's findings.
In addition, a finding of fact of a statement by URS could not have been made by
the Hearing Officer to effectuate estoppel because the sole evidence of a statement made
by URS was Mr. McLeod's disputed testimony of the 1996 conversations which was
inadmissible hearsay, and under Utah law cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact.
In Utah, administrative hearings are allowed to accept otherwise non-admissible hearsay
into evidence, but such hearsay evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act in Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-206(l)(c) states,
"The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay." However,
Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-208(3) limits the findings of fact which can be based on hearsay
in stating, "A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." Because
the only evidence of the alleged 1996 conversations with URS was Mr. McLeod's
hearsay testimony, as a matter of law, a finding of fact could not have been made
claiming URS made a statement which it later repudiated.
10

Second, Mr. McLeod cannot meet the second element of estoppel, which is the
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's
statement, admission, act or failure to act. Hearing Officer Howe correctly determined in
his Decision:
Here, a major career decision rested upon the answers to [Mr. McLeod's]
telephone inquiries. Or, as he testified, it was a "life changing" decision.
[HT 58:19-22 and HT 131:6-8] He could have requested written
confirmation from URS of the answers to the questions he asked. He could
have made a written record of the persons he talked to and their position in
URS. He could have had a professional review the statutes to verify what
he claims he had been told. A greater in-depth inquiry was warranted in
this major career decision than just two relatively brief telephone calls to
unnamed persons at URS.
HRat263.
Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly determined that Mr. McLeod failed to prove
his claim for estoppel against the Board as a governmental entity. Mr. McLeod did not
prove the "facts with specificity," nor "injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any
exception to the general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental
entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d at 827. In addition, Mr. McLeod
failed to prove the elements of estoppel because he could not prove URS made an
incorrect statement, or that he reasonably relied on that statement.

ARGUMENT
I.

URS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED U T A H C O D E A N N . §49-11504(9)(2007) IN CALCULATING MR. MCLEOD'S RETIREMENT BENEFIT WHICH
DIRECTS URS TO CALCULATE POST-RETIREMENT BENEFITS BASED ON TWO
PERIODS OF SERVICE.

11

Utah Code Ann. §49-1l-504(9)(2007), which governs retirement benefits for postretired employees, unambiguously requires URS to calculate Mr. McLeod5 s retirement
benefit based on two different periods of service. URS correctly did so for Mr. McLeod
by adding the retirement benefit he earned prior to his first retirement in December 1996,
to the retirement benefit he earned between 1999 and 2007, when he retired a second
time. The statute states in relevant part:
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has returned
to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall have the retiree's
allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all
service credit accrued prior to that date; and
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all service
credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates.
Despite Mr. McLeod's contentions to the contrary, the applicable statute in this
case is the statute in effect at the time the disputed benefit calculation was made. Here,
the 2007 statute governs the calculation of Mr. McLeod5 s disputed retirement benefit, not
the 1999 or 2000 statute when he returned to work, because 2007 is when Mr. McLeod5s
retirement benefit was calculated. Nevertheless, even if the 2000 statute is used, Mr.
McLeod still does not prevail because the language is plain in supporting URS5
calculation of his retirement benefit.1

1

Utah Code Ann. §49-l-505(4)(1996), section 49-1 l-5045s predecessor, states in relevant
part, "If a member is reinstated to active service and subsequently retires after the twoyear period as provided in Subsection (l)(a)(iv), the member's retirement allowance shall
be calculated using: (a) the formula in effect at the date of the member's original
retirement for all service prior to that date; and (b) the formula in effect at the date of the
subsequent retirement for all service rendered between the first and the subsequent
retirement dates.55 There is no substantive difference between this language and the
language in the 2007 statute.
12

When interpreting a statute, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "'[u]nder our
rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to determine
its meaning.'" Sindt v. Utah State Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, ^}8, 157 P.3d 797, (Utah 2007)
{quoting, Mountain Estates v. State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 86, %99 100 P.3d 1206).
"Only if we find some ambiguity need we look further." CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Tax
Comm yn, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995)(finding phrase "erroneously or illegally
collected" in refund statute was not ambiguous and State Tax Commission correctly
assessed taxes based on property valuation as of statutory valuation date). However,
"[t]he fact that the parties offer differing constructions of the statute, in and of itself, does
not mean that the statute is 'ambiguous.' See, Eppersen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 949
P.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more
plausible meanings.'" Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah
Ct. App. 1998)(quoting, Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah
1993); Village InnApts. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)). Further, "[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts
thereof relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,
1292 (Utah 1996)(citation and quotation omitted). "It is our duty to construe each act of
the legislature so as to give it full force and effect." Jordan School Dist. v. Sandy City
Corp., 2004 UT 37, f9, 94 P.3d 234, 237-38, quoting, Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d
770, 773 (Utah 1991).
In this case, in accordance with the plain language of the statute, URS calculated
Mr. McLeod's benefit by adding the retirement benefit he earned prior to his first
13

retirement in December 1996, to the retirement benefit he earned between 1999 and
2007, his second retirement date. The statute states:

9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree who has
returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and again retires shall
have the retiree's allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original retirement for all
service credit accrued prior to that date; and
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for all
service credit accrued between the first and subsequent retirement dates.
Mr. McLeod attempts to manufacture some ambiguity in the statute in claiming
that the word "formula" is ambiguous. See, Brief of Appellant at 40. Yet, he offers no
different interpretation of the word "formula" than what has already been accepted by
URS. URS and Mr. McLeod both agree that "formula" means the applicable retirement
formula used to calculate a retirement benefit, in this case, the public safety
noncontributory retirement system formula found in Utah Code Ann.§49-15-402(2007).
That formula will be different for each retirement system, but there is no dispute or
ambiguity as to the meaning of the word as used by the Legislature.
Instead, Mr. McLeod incorrectly argues that when the statute states that a person
in Mr. McLeod's situation will accrue "additional service credit" after retiring and
returning to the system, that this means his retirement benefit will be calculated based on
one term of service rather than two. Mr. McLeod's interpretation belies the plain
meaning of the statute for two reasons: 1) calculation of the retirement benefit is different
from service credit accrual; and 2) the Legislature clearly delineated two "terms of
service" in Utah Code sections 49-1 l-504(9)(a) and (9)(b), and used the conjunction
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"and", instead of "or" in describing how retirement benefits should be calculated. Each
of these reasons is discussed below.

First, in his argument Mr. McLeod incorrectly attempts to mix the issues of
service credit accrual with the issue of the proper calculation of his retirement benefit.
Mr. McLeod received "full credit" for his post-retirement employment with Davis
County Sheriffs Office between 1999 and when he retired a second time in 2007. When
his retirement benefit was recalculated in 2007, his retirement benefit for his service
between 1999 and 2007 was calculated pursuant to the applicable public safety formula
and added to his previous retirement benefit and his past credit earned. Thus, the
retirement benefit Mr. McLeod received in 2007 was significantly greater than the
retirement benefit he received in 1996 when he retired the first time. Hence, Mr. McLeod
was placed back into the applicable retirement system in all respects as the statute
dictates. He earned additional service credit and increased his retirement benefits in
accordance with the applicable statutes. Although his retirement benefit was not
calculated as he wished, he was a member of the system and was treated in all respects
like every other similarly situated individual.

Second, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) specifically enumerates two distinct
service time periods for recalculating a retirement benefit. The statute's plain language
requires a recalculation based on a) "all service credit accrued prior to [the retiree's
original retirement] date, and, b) "all service credit accrued between the first and
subsequent retirement dates." Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-504(9)(emphasis added). These
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two provisions clearly state that the benefit should be calculated in two pieces based on
the two service time periods. Finding otherwise would render this part of the statute
"meaningless" in violation of the statutory construction rules. Perrine v. Kennecott
Mining Corp,, 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)(holding "statutory enactments are to be
so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and ... interpretations
are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd.")
In addition, if the statute, as Mr. McLeod suggests, would have allowed the
calculation of Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit based on the combination of Mr.
McLeod's service, presumably the Legislature would have used the word "or" instead of
"and" between §§49-1 l-504(9)(a) and (b). By using the word "and", the Legislature
clearly indicated that URS should use both applicable formulas in calculating Mr.
McLeod's retirement benefits and not one or the other as Mr. McLeod desires.
Nevertheless, the plain language of the statute requires URS to calculate Mr.
McLeod's retirement benefit exactly as it did, by calculating his retirement benefit based
on two periods of service.

IL

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AMBIGUITY IN SECTION 49-11504(9), THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FAVOR URS' TERPRETATION
BECAUSE CONSTRUING OTHERWISE RENDERS THE STATUTE SUPERFLUOUS AND
VIOLATES THE STATED PURPOSES OF TITLE 49.

As stated supra, Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) contains no ambiguity. However,
in the alternative, if ambiguity is found, the statutory construction rules and public policy
considerations show that URS correctly applied the law in calculating Mr. McLeod's
benefits. Utah common law regarding statutory construction requires that finders of fact
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look to the legislative history and policy considerations when interpreting ambiguous
statutes. "Only when [the Court] fmd[s] ambiguity in the statute's plain language need
[the Court] seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations."
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah
1994). '"When interpreting an ambiguous statute, [the Court] first tr[ies] to discover the
underlying intent of the legislature, guided by the purpose of the statute as a whole and
the legislative history.' Hansen v. Salt Lake Co., 794 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah 1990)(citations
omitted). [The court] then tr[ies] to harmonize ambiguous provisions accordingly.
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991)." Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
The Legislature set forth the purpose of Title 49 in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-103:
(1) The purpose of this title is to establish:
(a) retirement systems and the Utah Governors' and Legislators' Retirement
Plan for members which provide:
(i) a uniform system of membership;
(ii) retirement requirements;
(iii) benefits for members;
(iv) funding on an actuarially sound basis;
(v) contributions; and
(vi) economy and efficiency in public service; and
(b) a central administrative office and a board to administer the various
systems, plans, and programs established by the Legislature or the board.
(2) This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and
protections consistent with soundfiduciary and actuarial principals.
(emphasis added).
Hence, URS is mandated to provide retirement benefits on an "actuarially sound
basis" and "consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principals." Judy Lund,
Director of the Retirement Department, testified at the hearing that allowing Mr. McLeod
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to retire and take benefits for two years, then cancel his benefit and recalculate it on a
higher final average salary, like he desires, would have a negative actuarial impact on the
retirement system and increase the retirement contribution rate. HT 233:4-11. She stated
that Mr. McLeod's benefit that he received between December 1996 and January 1999 is
worth "$139,407.20" in today's dollars. HT 234:15. Thus, if Mr. McLeod is allowed to
calculate his benefit as he desires, he will receive an approximate $140,000 windfall
which he did not earn and the law does not allow.
Indeed, it hardly takes an actuary to understand that if you pay into a system for a
few years, then begin drawing benefits from that system for a time without putting any
additional money in, you will have less money (all other things being equal) than an
individual who puts the same amount of money in an account, but does not draw on that
money in the first place. Therefore, the better interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11504(9) is URS' interpretation of how to calculate a post-retired employee's benefit which
is consistent with "sound actuarial principles" and in accordance with the purpose of Title
49.
In contrast, Mr. McLeod's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) cannot
be accepted because doing so would render that section insignificant and superfluous. In
Sutherland's Rules of Statutory Construction, often quoted by Utah Courts, it states, "A
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. . . . " §46.06. Utah Courts have
similarly held, "[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof
relevant and meaningful." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp,, 911 P.2d 1290, 1292
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(Utah 1996)(citation and quotation omitted). "It is our duty to construe each act of the
legislature so as to give it full force and effect." Jordan SchoolDist. v. Sandy City Corp.,
2004 UT 37, \9, 94 P.3d 234, 237-38, quoting, Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770,
773 (Utah 1991).
Despite the clear law, Mr. McLeod incorrectly claims that his benefit should be
calculated based on one period of service rather than the two that the statute requires
because of his retirement. He claims that 49-11-504(9) should be interpreted to mean
that a post-retirement benefit will only be calculated in two pieces if the legislature
happened to change the retirement formula between the first and second retirement dates.
See, Brief of Appellant at 41. However, such an interpretation to Utah Code Ann. §4911-504(9) would render it unnecessary or "superfluous" because any new legislative
action changing the retirement formula would automatically apply prospectively.
Contrary to Mr. McLeod5 s arguments, the Legislature had no need for a separate statute
allowing it to pass laws affecting retirement benefits in the future because it specifically
was granted that power through the Utah Constitution. See, Ut. Const, art. VI, § 1(1).
Mr. McLeod's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-11-501(9) seems to indicate that the
Legislature merely wanted to clarify its position that it could change the "formula" and
that it would have an effect at some future time. One wonders whether Mr. McLeod also
believes that the Legislature needs to clarify its ability to pass laws in every section of the
Utah Code. Thus, Mr. McLeod's interpretation of the statute is superfluous and renders
the statute insignificant in violation of the statutory construction rules.
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Hence, even if Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9) is found to be ambiguous, URS'
interpretation of the statute should prevail because URS' interpretation is consistent with
"sound actuarial principles" in accordance with the purpose of the statute, and because
Mr. McLeod's interpretation renders the statute "superfluous." Utah Code Ann. §49-11504(9) is clear that Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit should be calculated based on two
periods of service, which is exactly how URS calculated his retirement benefit.

III.

BECAUSE MR. MCLEOD FAILED TO PROVE AN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE, THAT
URS MADE A STATEMENT WHICH IT LATER REPUDIATED, OR THAT HE
REASONABLY RELIED ON URS' STATEMENTS TO HIS DETRIMENT, HE CANNOT
PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE BOARD AS A
GOVERNMENT AGENCY.

Mr. McLeod cannot prevail against URS under equitable estoppel because Mr.
McLeod failed to prove an unusual circumstance with such certainty to obtain estoppel
against URS as a governmental entity, and because even if the Hearing Officer applies
the common law estoppel rules, Mr. McLeod failed to prove either that URS made a
statement that it later repudiated or that Mr. McLeod reasonably relied to his detriment on
that alleged statement.
A.

Estoppel Cannot Be Invoked Against a Government Entity Absent
Unusual Circumstances and Grave Injustice.

"As a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In
Utah, there is a limited exception to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances'
'where it is plain that the interests ofjustice so require/ This exception applies, however,
only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of
sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n, 839
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P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(fmding that Commission was not estopped from revoking
limousine company's certificate of convenience and necessity after allegedly orally
settling all claims against company)(citations omitted). This governmental estoppel rule
has been characterized by the Utah Court of Appeals as a, "high standard of proof

"

Terry v. Retirement Bd.9 2007 UT 87, If 15, 157 P.3d 362, 366.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the following regarding the policy behind the
general government estoppel rule:
We have no doubt about the soundness nor the salutary purpose of the rule that
estoppel generally is not assertable against the government or governmental
institutions. There are good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including the
safeguarding of the interests of the public, which are often somewhat in hazard
because of the vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the
possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing
for the value of goods furnished or services rendered.
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982). Thus, if Mr.
McLeod is able to prevail against the Board for estoppel without evidence other than his
word that he was told incorrect information, it would undoubtedly open the door for
additional claims of less dubious merit at eventual great cost to the State and its political
subdivisions in increased retirement contribution rates to pay for these claims.
Certainly this policy played into Hearing Officer Howe's decision that "I do not
find certainty here in trying to reconstruct what was said in oral conversations taking
place in 1996 between Petitioner [Mr. McLeod] and unknown persons at URS." HR at
263 (emphasis added). Thus, Mr. McLeod failed to prove an "unusual circumstance" or
grave injustice because the substance of his alleged conversations with URS could not be
found with "certainty". Id.
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B.

Mr. McLeod's Claim for Estoppel Against the Board Fails for Lack of
a Statement Made by URS which was Inconsistent with a Claim Later
Asserted, and for Mr. McLeod's Lack of Reasonable Reliance to his
Detriment on those Alleged Statements.

Even if Mr. McLeod could sustain an estoppel claim against the Board as a
governmental entity, Mr. McLeod cannot prove the elements of estoppel. Specifically,
Mr. McLeod did not prove that URS made any statement which it later repudiated, nor
did Mr. McLeod reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged statements made by URS.
Utah Courts have stated that in order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel, Mr.
McLeod bears the burden to prove:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.
Hollandv. Career Service Review Bd.y 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(rejecting
employee's equitable estoppel claim); See also, Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(holding that Board was estopped from
decreasing member's benefit after he terminated his employment and retired). Mr.
McLeod cannot meet either of the first two elements of estoppel, let alone all of them as
required to prevail.
i.

Mr. McLeod failed to prove URS made a statement to him which it
later repudiated.

At the hearing, Mr. McLeod failed to prove URS ever made an incorrect or
inconsistent statement to him. The first element of estoppel is a statement made by one
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party inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd.y 856
P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) In order to challenge the Board's finding that Mr.
McLeod never received a statement by URS that URS later repudiated, Mr. McLeod must
properly marshal the evidence and then show how the finding was "clear error."
a.

Mr. McLeod failed to properly marshal the evidence to correctly
challenge the Hearing Officer's finding that URS never made a
statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated.

Mr. McLeod failed to correctly challenge the Hearing Officer's findings of fact
numbers four through seven, that Mr. McLeod failed to show URS made a statement to
him which it later repudiated, because he did not "marshal the evidence" supporting those
findings as required under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the common law. In order to prevail on a claim for estoppel under the common law
elements, Mr. McLeod must show that URS made a statement to him that it later
repudiated. Holland v. Career Service Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(To show estoppel, a Plaintiff must prove, "(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to
act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted ...".) Although Mr. McLeod
never affirmatively states he is challenging any of the Board's findings of fact, in his
argument on estoppel, he certainly implies that he is challenging those facts. Thus, the

2

In his Appellate Brief, Mr. McLeod specifically argues that the Retirement Office made
statements to him which it later repudiated. For example, McLeod brief makes the
following statements: "The numerous statements by employees of the Retirement Office
to Kevin McLeod clearly satisfy the first element for a claim of equitable estoppel[.]..."
Brief of the Appellant at 31; "[Mr. McLeod] was told on both [1996] occasions the same
thing [by the Retirement Office], that it would make no difference,... and that his total
retirement would be calculated based on his full years of service . . . " Brief of the
Appellant at 29-30; "Because of the statements and assured attitude of the retirement
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Board presumes that Mr. McLeod is challenging the Board's factual findings that Mr.
McLeod was never actually told that he could have his retirement benefit calculated the
way he now desires.
Utah R.App.P. 24(a)(9) states that "A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." The Utah Supreme
Court has held that "To successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party
'must marshall [sic] all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.5" Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT
42, ^[16, 164 P.3d 384, 390, quoting, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus.
Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has more recently added:
To adequately fulfill the marshaling requirement, the appellant must
temporarily assume the role of his adversary, presenting us, "in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists."
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 77, 100 P.3d 1177 (quoting Neely v.
Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724). A recital of the trial court's
findings with which the appellant disagrees does not amount to marshaling.
Rather, the appellant must educate the court as to exactly how the trial court
arrived at each of the challenged findings. This requires "a precisely
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the findings," correlated to
the location of that evidence in the record. Id. Failure to provide this
summary amounts to an invitation to the appellate court to invest its time
and resources to "go behind the trial court's factual findings" itself; an
officer that he talked to, McLeod left the Davis County Sheriffs Office with a high level
of comfort that his retirement would not be adversely affected." Brief of Appellant at 30;
and, "Nevertheless, we can be assured that those comments [by the Retirement Office
regarding how his retirement benefit would be calculated] were made .. ." Brief of
Appellant at 30.
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invitation which the appellate court may, in its discretion, refuse. Id. ^ 82 n.
16.
Therefore, appellants must first "present the evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court and not attempt to construe the evidence in a
light favorable to their case." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^ 26, 140 P.3d 1200 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Then, appellants must "explain why those
findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id. Once appellants
have established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those pillars fail
to support the trial court's findings. They must show the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton City, 2010 UT 11,1H|10, 12,
228 P.3d 1242.
In this case, Mr. McLeod made no attempt to comply with the "marshaling"
requirement of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. McLeod failed to
provide a "precisely focused summary" of the evidence in the "light most favorable" to
the Hearing Officer's findings and failed to show any fatal flaws in the Hearing Officer's
findings. Although Mr. McLeod's Appellate Brief set forth 13 pages and 81 separate
"relevant facts", some of which were inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's factual
findings , he did not properly challenge the Board's findings of fact because of his failure
to "marshal the evidence" as required to challenge such factual findings before an
appellate court under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It appears that
3

See e.g. Mr. McLeod's Appellate Brief facts 10, 12-13, 18, 28, and 33, asserting as a
fact that in 1996 URS made an incorrect statement to Mr. McLeod regarding how his
benefit would be calculated. Brief of Appellant at 14-15, 17. Mr. McLeod's Appellate
Brief facts also mischaracterized much of Ms. Judy Lund's testimony. Brief of Appellant
at 20-24.
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Mr. McLeod failed to realize that u[t]his court does not retry the facts, Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991); it reviews them for clear error. Housekeeper
v. State, 2008 UT 78, ^|18, 197 P.3d 636." Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. v. Mapleton
City, 2010 UT 11,1fl2, 228 P.3d 1242.
Although no specific remedy is warranted for a failure to marshal the evidence, the
Utah Appellate Courts have held that, "[i]f the marshaling requirement is not m e t . . . [the
Courts] assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings" and may "affirm . . .
on that basis alone." Commercial Debenture Corp. v. Amenti, Inc., 2010 UT 10, ^[14, 231
P.3d 804, 807, quoting, Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, TJ80, 100 P.3d 1177, 1196 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also; Friends, 2010 UT 11^ ^[13 ("As Friends has not met
the marshaling requirement, we will assume that the trial court's findings are supported
by the evidence and therefore are not clearly erroneous."). Because Mr. McLeod cannot
marshal the evidence in a reply brief (See e.g., Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm % 2002 UT 112,fflf40-41, 61 P.3d 1053 (attempting to marshal evidence in a
reply brief were "eleventh hour" tactics which denies appellee the chance to respond and
defend the evidence.)), and because the Hearing Officer, Hearing Officer, made clear his
findings of fact which are supported by the evidence, URS respectfully requests that this
Court refuse to look behind the Hearing Officer's factual findings.
b.

Even if this Court determines to review the Hearing Officer's
findings of fact, the hearing record supports the Hearing Officer's
findings that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod which it
later repudiated.
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The hearing record shows that the Board's findings of fact are supported by the
record and are not "clear error." The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the standard of
review in estoppel cases before the retirement board present "a mixed question, which
'involves the application of law to fact.'" Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, % 8,
157 P.3d 362 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 33 n.12, 70 P.3d 111). We
review the underlying facts for clear error and the application of the law to those facts for
correctness. See id" Whitaker v. Retirement Bd, 2008 UT App 282, f 11, 191 P.3d 814.
The "clear error" standard of review comes from Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure which states in relevant part, "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Thus, in challenging a factual finding, McLeod bears the burden to show that
the factual finding was "clearly erroneous."
A hearing officer's finding of fact is only clearly erroneous if it is so lacking in
support as to be against the "clear weight of the evidence." Uncon Utah, LLC v. Fluor
Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, f 11, 210 P.3d 263, quoting In re Estate ofBartell, 116
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); See alsoy Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, Tfl9, 100 P.3d 1177,
1184. In addition, "[t]he trial court's factual findings will not be considered clearly
erroneous unless they are 'not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.'" Save Our
Schs. v. Bd. OfEduc, 2005 UT 55, % 9, 122 P.3d 611, 613, quoting State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). In this case, because the Hearing Officer's findings of fact
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are supported by the clear weight of the evidence, particularly in light that all disputes
must be resolved in favor of the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, they are not "clear
error" and must be upheld.
Specifically, the Hearing Officer's relevant findings of fact are numbers four
through seven. They state:
4. URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS at
any time during the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr. McLeod
claimed to have spoken with URS by telephone at least twice in October or
November of 1996 regarding what would happen if he were to retire from
Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis County at a later date.
HT 13:3-20:2.
5. Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a document
or a recording, of the substance of any conversations with URS in 1996.
The only evidence of the substance of these conversations is Mr. McLeod's
testimony that a URS employee told him if he retired and later returned to
work for Davis County that his retirement benefit would be cancelled upon
his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time his benefit
would be based on all his years of service credit combined and would be
calculated as one period of service.
6. URS disputed Mr. McLeod's assertion that a URS employee told him that
if he retired and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be
recalculated at his second retirement based on one period of service and
using his new and significantly higher three highest years of salary.
7. Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS with
the understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two years
to the same office, retire later a second time and have his retirement benefit
calculated on the basis of one period of employment. However, he has not
met his burden of proof that he was actually told that.
HR at 293-94.
Each of these facts is supported by the testimony taken at the hearing. For
example, Ms. Judy Lund, Retirement Director at URS testified at the hearing that URS
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has no record of any phone call from Mr. McLeod to URS in 1996. HT 147:24 - 148:12
and HT 156:9 - 157:20. Despite Mr. McLeod claiming he spoke with URS twice in 1996
regarding retirement options, URS specifically disputed Mr. McLeod's version of the
substance of these phone calls. HT 225:10-226:4; 235:6-23. Ms. Lund also testified that,
pursuant to URS policy in 1996, any phone calls regarding post-retirement retirement
calculation questions, like the ones Mr. McLeod alleged he asked, would have been
transferred to her. HT 182:1-183:5. Ms. Lund testified that she knew the correct answer
to the questions Mr. McLeod was alleged to have asked URS in 1996 and that she would
not have told Mr. McLeod that his final benefit would be calculated on one period of
employment as Mr. McLeod now desires. HT 222:24-223:20; HT 182:1-183:5; HT 235:
6-23. In addition, Ms. Lund was specifically not aware of anyone else at URS that would
have said what Mr. McLeod claims was said. HT 223: 6-20; 225:10-25.
Most significantly, the sole evidence presented to prove that Mr. McLeod was told
that he could calculate his post-retirement benefit on one period is Mr. McLeod's own
self-serving testimony that URS told him that was the case in several brief phone
conversations in 1996, almost 13 years prior to the hearing. Mr. McLeod provided no
other witnesses to the conversation. In addition, Mr. McLeod provided no written
statement from URS confirming his alleged conversation with URS. In fact, all the
written correspondence between Mr. McLeod and URS confirms URS's position that he
was consistently told that his benefit would be calculated in two pieces. See, HR at 171,
174,176-177,179, and 182.
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These facts supported the hearing officer's conclusion in his Decision that
although Petitioner believed he could "retire, draw retirement, return in two years to the
same office, retire a second time and have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of
one period of employment... I cannot find that [Petitioner] was actually told that in
either [1996 phone] call." HR at 262.
Thus, because the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are supported by the Hearing
Record, they are not against the "clear weight of the evidence", and should be upheld.
By upholding the findings of fact that URS never made a statement to Mr. McLeod which
it later repudiated, Mr. McLeod5 s claim for estoppel against the Board of necessity fails.
c.

Disputed oral statements that are inadmissible hearsay are not
enough to prove a statement was made to effectuate estoppel against
a governmental entity.

In addition to the reasons already discussed supra, a statement by URS could not
be found by the Hearing Officer to effectuate estoppel against URS because disputed oral
representations alone are not enough to prove a statement against a governmental entity,
and because the sole evidence of a statement made by URS was Mr. McLeod's disputed
testimony of the conversations which was inadmissible hearsay, and under Utah law
cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact.
Despite Mr. McLeod's arguments, disputed oral statements are not enough to
prevail against a governmental entity on a claim for estoppel. See e.g. Terry v.
Retirement Bd, 2007 UT App 87, Whitaker v. Utah State Retirement Bd.9 2008 UT App
282, 191 P.3d 814. In both Terry and Whitaker, the Court found that general written
statements (a life insurance policy and retirement annual statements) were not enough to
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prevail on a claim for estoppel. Therefore, if these written statements are not enough to
effectuate estoppel, it logically follows that disputed oral representations can never be
enough to prevail on an estoppel claim. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Anderson v.
Public Service Comm % 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992), "The few cases in which Utah
courts have permitted estoppel against the government have involved very specific
written representations by authorized government entities." Id. (emphasis added).
For example, Mr. McLeod mistakenly relies on Eldredge v. Retirement Bd, 795
P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) as his authority for why he should prevail on estoppel.
See, Brief of Appellant at 31 and 34. However, in this case where the Court allowed
estoppel against URS, URS admittedly communicated with Mr. Eldredge both orally and
in specific writing that the disputed service credit was granted to him under law,
including providing him a letter stating that the 6.123 years of disputed service were
eligible for service credit and a retirement estimate showing that he had obtained these
years of service credit. Unlike Eldredge, in this case URS specifically denies ever
making an incorrect statement to Mr. McLeod.
Additionally, as a matter of law, the Hearing Officer could not make a finding that
URS made an oral disputed statement to Mr. McLeod which it later repudiated because
such a finding of fact would be based solely on inadmissible hearsay. In Utah,
administrative hearings are allowed to accept otherwise non-admissible hearsay into
evidence, but such hearsay evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. The
Utah Administrative Procedures Act in Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-206(l)(c) states, "The
presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay." However, Utah
31

Code Ann. §63G-4-208(3) limits the findings of fact which can be based on hearsay in
stating, "A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on hearsay
evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence."
Mr. McLeod desires to use his testimony of the disputed hearsay conversations
between URS and Mr. McLeod in 1996 as the sole evidence to prove that URS made
statements which it later repudiated.4 Because his testimony is the sole basis for proving
URS made a statement which it later repudiated, no finding of fact can be made that URS
made such a statement to Mr. McLeod.
Mr. McLeod may respond to this problem as he did before the Hearing Officer
that Mr. McLeod5s testimony of URS5 statements to him are merely trying to show his
"state of mind55 when he retired, and thus the alleged statements are an exception to the
hearsay rule. HR at 227-228. However, if such is the case, Mr. McLeod has then
provided absolutely no evidence that a statement was made by URS which was later
repudiated.
Mr. McLeod also argued before the Hearing Officer that he was not offering his
testimony of the conversations with URS to prove the truth of the matter asserted or to
"show that what he was told was true55, and thus, these statements were not hearsay at all.
HR at 257. If Mr. McLeod claims that his testimony is not necessarily true regarding the
conversations with URS, he once again has no evidence for the substance of these

4

Mr. McLeod may also claim that URS made other written statements to him after his
first retirement in 1996 which he claims were misleading. These alleged statements are
not relevant to the matter because they did not affect his decision to retire the first time
with URS in December 1996 which is his claimed "reliance55 on URS5 statements.
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conversations and no finding of fact can be made in that regard. What it appears that Mr.
McLeod fails to realize is that in order to prevail on a claim for estoppel, he has the
burden to prove, under UTAH CODE ANN. §49-11-613(4), that he received a statement
by URS which was later repudiated. Because his only evidence of such a statement was
inadmissible hearsay, as a matter of law, no finding of fact could have been made based
solely on Mr. McLeod5 s disputed testimony. As such, Mr. McLeod cannot prevail on the
first crucial element of estoppel.
ii.

The Hearing Officer correctly determined that Mr. McLeod's reliance on
the alleged URS statements was not reasonable.

In addition to not being able to prove a statement made by URS, Mr. McLeod
cannot meet the second element of estoppel, which is the reasonable action or inaction by
the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to
act. In the few cases where estoppel has been permitted against a government entity, they
have each involved very specific reliance and grave injustice. For example, in Celebrity
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the Plaintiffs
spent over $200,000 in renovating their club in direct reliance on the Liquor
Commission's statements that they were in compliance with the law. In the Eldredge
case, the Plaintiff quit his job and irrevocably retired based on the written letter and
information the Retirement Office had sent to him. In this case, there is no such
reasonable reliance.
Hearing Officer Howe correctly determined in his Decision:
Here, a major career decision rested upon the answers to [Mr. McLeod5s]
telephone inquiries. Or, as he testified, it was a "life changing" decision.
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[HT 58:19-22 and HT 131:6-8] He could have requested written
confirmation from URS of the answers to the questions he asked. He could
have made a written record of the persons he talked to and their position in
URS. He could have had a professional review the statutes to verify what
he claims he had been told. A greater in-depth inquiry was warranted in
this major career decision than just two relatively brief telephone calls to
unnamed persons at URS.
HRat263.
In addition, as noted by Hearing Officer Howe, the Legislature placed a statutory
duty on Mr. McLeod to understand his rights and responsibilities concerning his
retirement benefits. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(1 )(a) states, "All members, retirees,
participants, alternative payees, or covered individuals of a system, plan or program
under this title shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this title."
Therefore, "life changing" decisions based on brief telephone conversations with
unknown persons at URS do not rise to the level of reasonable reliance to prevail on a
claim for estoppel.
In sum, Mr. McLeod failed to prove his claim for estoppel against the Board as a
governmental entity. Mr. McLeod did not prove the "facts with specificity," nor
"injustice of sufficient gravity" to invoke any exception to the general rule that estoppel
may not be invoked against a governmental entity. Anderson v. Public Service Comm 'n,
839 P.2d at 827. In addition, Mr. McLeod failed to prove the elements of estoppel
because he could not prove URS made a statement, or that he reasonably relied on that
statement. Thus, Mr. McLeod's estoppel claim against the Board must be rejected in its
entirety.
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CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-504(9)(2007) unambiguous requires URS to calculate Mr.
McLeod's retirement benefit, being a post-retired employee, based on two separate
periods of service.
In addition, Mr. McLeod's allegations regarding estoppel fail because he failed to
properly marshal the evidence to challenge findings of fact, because he cannot prove facts
with "certainty" to show that URS made a statement which it later repudiated, and
because he failed to reasonably rely to his detriment on the alleged URS statements. As
such, the Court should uphold the Hearing Officer's decision deny Mr. McLeod's request
for relief in its entirety.

DATED this H I

day of July, 2010.

B.Hans
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
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ADDENDUM A

;Z I "Z, \ ^ ^

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

KEVIN MCLEOD,
Petitioner,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

File #: 07-16R

Respondent.

A hearing was held on August 19, 2009, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Kevin Mcleod ("Mr. McLeod") was represented by Mr.
Reed M. Richards and Brandon R. Richards. The Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was
represented by Mr. David Hansen and Liza Eves of Howard, Phillips & Andersen. Based upon
the testimony given, the evidence received, and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer issued a memorandum decision on October 14, 2009, denying Petitioner's
Request for Board Action. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the following Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. McLeod worked for Bountiful City and then for the Davis County Sherriff s Office
accruing just over 20 years of service credit in the Public Safety Noncontributory
Retirement System by November 1996. Hearing Transcript [hereinafter "HT"] 5:4-12.
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2.

In or about October 1996, Mr. McLeod was offered a position at Browning Arms. HT
9:12-17,22:5-21.

3.

Mr. McLeod testified that he was concerned about his financial situation and determined
to call the retirement department at the Utah State Retirement Office ("URS") with
questions about his benefits. HT 12:2-9.

4.

URS has no record of a telephone call between Mr. McLeod and URS at any time during
the year 1996. HT 156:16-157:20. However, Mr. McLeod claimed to have spoken with
URS by telephone at least twice in October or November of 1996 regarding what would
happen if he were to retire from Davis County, and then come back to work for Davis
County at a later date. HT 13:3-20:2.

5.

Mr. McLeod failed to provide any verifiable evidence, such as a document or a recording,
of the substance of any conversations with URS in 1996. The only evidence of the
substance of these conversations is Mr. McLeod's testimony that a URS employee told
him if he retired and later returned to work for Davis County that his retirement benefit
would be cancelled upon his reemployment, and that when he retired the second time his
benefit would be based on all his years of service credit combined and would be
calculated as one period of service.

6.

URS disputed Mr. McLeod*s assertion that a URS employee told him that if he retired
and was reemployed, his benefit for all of his years would be recalculated at his second
retirement based on one period of service and using his new and significantly higher three
highest years of salary.

7.

Mr. McLeod came away from those phone conversations with URS with the
understanding that he could retire, draw retirement, return in two years to the same office,
retire later a second time and have his retirement benefit calculated on the basis of one

2

000293

period of employment. However, he has not met his burden of proof that he was actually
told that.
8.

Mr. McLeod retired from his Davis County Sheriffs office position in December 1996
and went to work for Browning Arms. HT 9:12-17,22:5-21.

9.

Between December 1996 and January 1999, URS paid Mr. McLeod his statutorily earned
retirement benefits totaling approximately $50,000. HT: 85:8-15.

10.

Mr. McLeod returned to work for Davis County in January 1999, and pursuant to the
retirement laws, had his retirement benefit cancelled while he remained employed. HT
22:25-23:4; 86:7-15.

11.

In March of 2001, while still employed by Davis County, Mr. McLeod contacted URS
and understood for the first time that his benefit would not be calculated the way he
wished. HT 37:17-38:21.

12.

Mr. McLeod continued working for the Davis County Sheriffs Office until April 16,
2007, when he voluntarily terminated his employment, retired, and began receiving his
retirement benefits. HT 47:5-18;48:2-25.

13.

In April 2007, URS calculated Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit, pursuant to the relevant
statute, based on two periods of service: 1) the service he performed prior to his first
retirement, and 2) the service he performed between his first and second retirement. URS
then added these calculations together to determine Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit.
Mr. McLeod received full retirement service credit for each of his years he worked for
public employers participating with URS. HT 170:17-23; 240: 15-22.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In April 2007, URS correctly followed the statutory scheme in U,C.A. §49-11-504(9)

(2007) in calculating Mr. McLeod's retirement benefit which is based on two periods of service.
That statute states:
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a retiree
who has returned to work, accrued additional service credit, and
again retires shall have the retiree's allowance recalculated using:
(a) the formula in effect at the date of the retiree's original
retirement for all service credit accrued prior to that date; and
(b) the formula in effect at the date of the subsequent retirement for
all service credit accrued between the first and subsequent
retirement dates.
2.

U.C.A. §49-11-504(9) (2007) contains no ambiguity. The plain language of the statute

supports URS' calculation of Mr. McLeod's benefits based on two periods of service.
3.

U.C.A. §49-11-613(1) (2007) requires that, "All members, retirees,... or covered

individuals of a system .. . shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this
title." Thus, the ultimate responsibility to understand retirement benefit rights, including
retirement calculations lies with the member.
4.

Mr. McLeod cannot prevail on a claim for estoppel against URS. "As a general rule,

estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity. In Utah, there is a limited exception
to this general principle for 'unusual circumstances' 'where it is plain that the interests of justice
so require.' This exception applies, however, only if 'the facts may be found with such certainty,
and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception.'" Anderson v. Public
Service Comm% 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted).
5.

The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by

one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to act; and (3)
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injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement
Board, 795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990); Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678 (
Utah Ct.App. 1993).
6,

Mr. McLeod has not proved with "certainty" the representations of URS upon which he

relies. Additionally, his reliance on those representations if they were made, was not reasonable
under his circumstances of making a major career decision.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mr. McLeod's request for board action that his
retirement benefit should be calculated on one period of service based on U.C.A. §49-11 -504(9)
must be and is denied. In addition, Mr. McLeod 5s argument that URS should be estopped from
calculating his benefit in two periods as statutorily required is also denied.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.
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JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, he may seek a judicial review within
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-101 et. seq.

/vi?

DATED this ^

day of / > ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 9 .

Richard C. Howe
Adjudicative Hearing Officer

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
Dated this / 7

day of D ^ ^ J ^ ^

, P/j^j

.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the _ 2 / 2 r day of "p-f.^-

, 2009,1 mailed a true and

correct copy of the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, postage pre-paid,
to the following:

Mr. Reed M. Richards
Mr. Brandon R. Richards
2568 Washington Blvd, Suite 200
Ogden,Utah 84401
David Hansen
Liza Eves
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

7
0 nn 9Qn

